HOME
WHY CHOOSE US
FAQS
OUR BLOG
ABOUT US
CONTACT US

The Wall Street Journal reported today that Maguire Properties, one of the largest office property owners in Southern California and a client that I have represented in the past, has warned that it will very likely default on $1.06 billion worth of debt encumbering seven properties.  Maguire has said that it will likely turn the properties over to creditors rather than continue to operate them at cash-flow negative levels.  Yet another sign of the troubles that await the commercial real estate market, the defaults on the Maguire loans appear to be payment defaults resulting from the sharp decrease in market rents and the dramatic rise in the vacancy rate.  The article states that vacancy rates in Orange County are nearing 20%, up from only 6% three years ago.

Maguire briefly mentions that restructuring the debt is an option but it appears that their situation may be too dire.  Analysts believe that their entire portfolio may be under water, making a long term restructuring solution a very unlikely option.  Nevertheless, a restructuring option is still on the table and for individual investors may be more realistic than for an institutional investor like Maguire.  The workout of a small single asset debt is much less of a daunting task than restructuring over a billion dollars worth of CMBS debt.

Pension funds who had been hit hard by the downturn in real estate are apparently venturing back into the asset class.  The Wall Street Journal reported today that Cadillac Fairview Corp., which is owned by Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, bought a 49% stake in Queens Center Mall from Macerich Co., a client that I have represented in the past in connection with debt offerings.  Cadillac paid $150 million in equity and assumed $167 million in debt.

This is fairly significant news in that pension funds are major players in the real estate market and getting them back into the game will be a major boost for commercial real estate.  Also noteworthy is the fact that they invested in retail properties which is an asset class that has been and will continue to be hit very hard by the current recession.  This purchase, along with a $463 million investment made by California Public Employees’ Retirement System in a portfolio of 86 shopping centers, is a very positive indication.  These could very well be anomalies, but with the market the way it currently is any sign of hope is good.  I’m going to keep monitoring these developments and keep you posted of any new positive signs.

The Business Insider posted an interesting chart today showing the rapid rate at which commercial real estate loans are going into default.  Deutsche Bank, a company that I have represented in the past on several deals, which has been generally very pessimistic about the condition of the real estate markets had to revise its projections even further downward as a result of this latest quarter.  Deutsche Bank is now projecting that the delinquency rate for commercial loans will now reach somewhere between 6-7% by the end of 2009, up from their previous estimate of 3.5%.

Interestingly enough, the worsening problems on the commercial side seem to have more to do with the fledgling economy that has reduced rents and caused many business to break leases and less to do with the lack of liquidity that most analysts believed would be the root of the problem.  As a result, defaults are occurring sooner than expected because the defaults are now a result of inability of borrowers to make mortgage payments and not the inability of borrowers to refinance upon maturity which was the original concern.

Regardless, lenders are going to have to start addressing the commercial real estate market and are going to have to do it soon.  It will be interesting to see if they learn from the residential meltdown or if they will make the same mistakes before they begin further embracing the loan modification concept that salvaged what was left of the residential market.  Many banks have already seen the light, now it’s time for the rest to follow suit.

Another report by Reuters today states that commercial real estate prices dropped a record amount in the second quarter of 2009.  According to a study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for Real Estate, commercial real estate prices fell 18.1% in the second quarter, off nearly 39% from the markets peak in mid-2007.  Although the new for the most part seemed fairly pessimistic, there was a sign of hope.  The index measuring prices that current commercial property owners would be willing to sell their properties at fell a record 18.5%.  This may be an indication that the market is reaching its bottom.
Â
Whether or not this potential bottom is a silver lining for lenders is a different question.  If this actually is a bottom, what type of bottom is it?  Is it a V-shaped bottom which would mean a near term increase in property prices?  Or is it a U-shaped bottom which would mean that these highly depressed prices are here to stay for some time?  In the case of a U-shaped bottom, these depressed prices would basically prohibit any refinancing of commercial loans that were made between 2005 and 2007.  The price decline would be too great and the value of most of these properties would be far below the amount of principal owed on their loans.  Without the possibility of refinancing, the number of maturity defaults will increase dramatically leaving banks with the options of foreclosing, selling the note at a discount or negotiating for a loan modification.

Another day and another article sounding the alarm of the impending collapse of the commercial real estate markets.  Reuters reported today that the worst is yet to come for real estate loans.  Analysts estimate that banks will likely continue to take write-downs on commercial loans for the next two years and the number of such loans in default will continue to rise.  Although the article doesn’t propose or discuss solutions to this problem, there seem to be only a couple of options.  Lenders can begin to foreclose on defaulted properties.  That, however, is costly and forces banks to go into the business of owning real estate which is not what a bank is in the business of doing.  Also, in all likelihood banks will suffer a loss on the sale of the property.  Lenders can also sell notes that they hold at a discount.  This also, however, ensures that the bank will take a loss on their investment but it provides them the comfort of knowing that another bad loan is off their books.  Another option is to negotiate a commercial loan modification.  This allows the bank to save on the cost and expense of a foreclosure and gives them the opportunity to recoup their principal, something not possible when they sell the note.

The commercial real estate market encountered its first layer of problems when the credit markets crashed because lending on new deals ceased to exist over night. Many commercial real estate transactions were abruptly halted, borrowers with strong banking relationships and even stronger financial statements were rejected and funding for commercial real estate deals disappeared altogether. 

At the time, the market did not fully comprehend the extent of the damage and the compounding problems that would be caused by the years of free flowing cheap credit based on artificial real estate values. 

Since this infamous credit crash of 2008, circumstances have aligned to create the perfect storm. The commercial real estate market literally does not exist. There is no debt available to finance deals and there have not been enough deals done to determine current property values. Next, the few deals that have been transacted indicate a significant decline in property values and a sharp increase in cap rates.

It gets even messier once you consider fundamental value measuring tools such as rents. With vacancies increasing, landlords have decreased rents significantly across the board in all areas of commercial real estate including retail, office, industrial, and multifamily properties. Thus, purchasers and lenders simply don’t know how to valuate property. It’s cause for concern when a bank does not know how much a property is worth anymore. They are forced to lend far more conservatively than they used to, and this means borrowers have to put more cash into each deal.

All of this leads to the glaring problem at hand, MATURING LOANS!!!  If banks can’t valuate real estate and they have far less money to lend, what are borrowers going to do as their loan mature? What will they do as the loans they made between 2005-2008 begin maturing.  During those years banks were lending at higher loan-to-value ratios (LTV’s) and property values were higher than now. According to Bloomberg, almost $165 Billion in commercial debt is maturing in 2009 alone. Does anyone have a solution to this problem, with billions of dollars in loans maturing and no money to refinance?

If you consider the possible options, there are a few available to banks and borrowers. The $165 Billion in notes is probably secured by approximately $113 Billion in property (40% discount from 85% LTV, I can explain if you need further explaining), putting banks and borrowers under secured. If the banks call these loans as they mature, the borrower can either come up with the money, find a lender that will refinance the property after a large capital infusion by the borrower, or give the keys of the property back to the banks. The lenders can change their business from lending to asset management and we can see where the world goes. On the other hand, the banks can pick and choose on a case by case basis what they will do with each one of these assets based on borrower’s strength, property’s value and various other factors that I’d rather bill to discuss.

The real question is, what will banks do in 2011-13 as the 5 year notes from 2006-2008 start maturing??

« Newer Posts